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THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE MYTH: UNPLEASANT DUAL CHOICE BETWEEN THE NATO AND EU

The successful end of the Cold war and accent of democratic values and market economies has given us an unparalleled opportunity to shape, with others, a safer, freer, more prosperous world. The challenge for our democracies during the first decade of the new millennium is to sustain our success and defense new dangers. In the 21 st century we must deepen our transatlantic partnership to sustain this cooperation. A strengthened European Security and Defense Identity is central to this vision, as the success of NATO's initiative to enhance Europe's defense capabilities. The only way to provide security for our people in the decade ahead is to exercise leadership together for the interests and values we share.

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ABSTRACT:

In this article we argued in detail the major issues after globalization process and collapse of the Soviet Union which results end of the Cold War era on the Transatlantic agenda to assess how each might influence the overall European relationship in the future of **European Defense** myth. Specifically, we assessed the state of the European collective security debate on development of policy options on **NATO and EU** relations. We also tried to understand the concept and plan of action for **ESDI-European Security and Defense Identity and Policy** in order to assess what the future might look like from a Transatlantic perspective. This paper will try to explain to divide has three aspects: **First**, differences in the general attitude towards a “**globalization**” effects of NATO and EU; **Secondly**, the timing and implications of future **enlargement of NATO and EU institutions possibly 2005** the impact of various policy options on future Transatlantic security relationships. And **finally**, we discussed possible developments and framework of **possible crisis areas and new threats** in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and defense alternatives against to **ballistic missile threats**.

Why have I looked at the matter in this vision? Because, in spite of the positive transformation process in macro level power balances and security concern in European concern, there are **non- – changing** determinants. **First**, in spite of the NATO Treaty Article V missions have changed with general peace keeping operations priorities, proliferation of **WMD-Weapons of Mass Destruction's** around the NATO borders. In this regard Turkey is under the big pressure of WMD and its critical deliver systems with ballistic missile threat. **Secondly**, in contrary to conventional capacity of EU security dimensions, since its capacity his very difficult to answer against the WMD threat unless the US nuclear deterrence guarantee and early warning capabilities continue, is not easy to discriminate possible conflicts. **Thirdly**, Turkey considering **blockading** himself from the new European Security concern in spite of his possible bridge mission Prof. Bağcı stressed that either **pivotal** or **multi-regional** power roles in changing Eurasia geopolitical balances.

INTRODUCTION:

Globalization is forcing every institution one to rethink of all the security strategies and defense policymaking studies. As is true in other areas, international community is still coming to estimates to build a possible consensus with what real parameters globalization is and what it means for **foreign and defense policy**, and how strategic studies and policymakers need to reorient their traditional ways of thinking and working in an increasingly globalize world. They would bring together “**soft**” and “**hard**” power, to use Joseph Nye's terminology, as part of a grander strategy for shaping a new international system [1]. ‘The new organizing principles of **regional and global security** are **democracy**, good governance and the rule of law. There are close relationships between globalization and international security, on the one hand, and democratization, **human rights** and respect for the **rights of minorities**, on the other. In the 21st century democracy should be seen not only as a form of government but also as a way towards the peaceful coexistence of nations. Whole these new features are often summed up in a phenomenon called **globalization**, which can be defined as the international interaction of information, financial capital, commerce, technology, and even labor at exponentially greater speeds.

The proliferation of **international organizations, institutions**, the great impact of government policies both at internal and external policies, cultural differences, and evolving security considerations demand that we understand globalization before we can determine the optimum course to steer. The beginning of the XXI century has been filled with such striking new features that few can avoid the allure and burden of seriously examining and pondering their implications. In this regard, since the end of the Cold War the pace of contemporary diplomatic activities have developed more significant roles for organized more complex dialogues that have resulted in a **collapse of ideological hostilities** in and around the EUROPE. This dialogue is also creating an additional layer of diplomacy in which **non-state actors** such as universities, research institutes, NGO's, IGO's positively communicate both with states and associations of states, and other actors learning the art and practice of diplomacy.

This **new environment** is already having a dramatic effect on domestic and international business, as well as on collective security policies - especially about the changing liberal democratic environment- in European continent between the **NATO and EU** beyond the Cold War also enhanced the principles of “**Democratic actors don't fight each other**”. To develop a better understanding of the phenomenon of globalization and its implications to examine and debate the attributes and effects of globalization on national security and peace for around the European geostrategic axes [2]. Europe living **radical and dramatic changes** in over the recently 15 years, particular-

ly political, economic and in the field of security. However, at the same time three things are affected in security issues. **First**, Europe after changing security environment wants to gain its previous political, military and economic power again with his **Europe can defense by the Europeans** strategy, which remarked by the general De Gaulle vision. This reality brings decrease the defense budgets more than 100 billion dollars, Ambassador Oymen remarks and military readiness capabilities. Also, Jeffrey GEDMIN explained “Less Independence’s” trends between the Europe and traditional transatlantic link. This important development results a **new bargaining** between the US and EU defense expenditure and modernization discussions especially after new allies participated to the NATO alliance Mr. Anthony BLINKEN stressed this issue. **Second**, ethnic nationalist activation has results critical new conflicts, which created new threats in regional security agenda. **Third**, Russia preferred its own security policy strategies by non- participation NATO and ESDI enlargement process since there is no response *Primus Inter Pares* demands in spite of his large defense machinery system.

1. EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM AND TRANSFORMATION PROCESS:

Internationally, the dramatic opening of societies and states in the **international system** has also been a double-edged sharp **Persian sword**. That is an important point to make because, even the improving the prospects for the successful transition to democracy and market-based economics with highly positive developments in a macro-sense, but in contrary there is also emergence of new threats, risks, and vulnerabilities such as separate nationalism, ethnic conflicts, proliferation of mass destruction weapons, international terrorism, and illegal drug traffics. It's a question that has ignited a tense struggle about the European Defense policy and strategic affairs thinking between the NATO and EU the region and beyond. It is a real phenomenon that managing the implications of the break-up of the former Soviet Union and the **Warsaw Pact**, the seemingly **never-ending** conflicts in the **Balkans**, increasing Western norms and institutions in Central and Eastern Europe, and expanding and reforming the North Atlantic Alliance are just some of the issues that require transformation in their stability's. There are different following questions and uncertainties about the European Security futures, which will be shaped in way of future:

- Will this transformation be **accelerated** through **NATO expansion**, or will it be held back?
- What is the real purpose of the **EU's new security** policy? Is Europe's goal to take on a larger geography or cultural identity norms share of the defense burden?
- The decision of the EU to craft a common security and defense policy will not **duplicate** the role of the NATO or drive a **wider cooperation** between Europe and the Transatlantic Link?
- How do **European States** and **Transatlantic Community** compare to where we are today and new proposals to restructure and expand the scope of to **manage** the **strategic challenges** of futures threats?
- Will **NATO expansion** lead to a build-up of anti-Western feeling or are the global pull so strong that it doesn't matter?
- Will **Russia** feel **isolated** and **offended** or will see its advantage in the competition between the NATO and EU cooperation?
- Is it possible to close the possible gap between the non – EU members NATO Allies “in-Europe agenda” – the creation of a Europe whole and free in alliance?
- What kind of **defense policies** would **Allies ideally want** to have for European Security policies?

The possible ideal answer to these entire questions is that we must can open the dialogue channels clearly. It is always easier to analyze what is wrong or missing in current policy than to come up with the answer. In ideal academic dimension, the general aim of this paper has not been to only criticize. Can we image wider and more comprehensive which should **eliminate separatism** in European and what can be done in order to prevent the defense issue from becoming a decisively dividing issue for the Atlantic Alliance. However, that will happen only if allies on both sides of the Atlantic share a broad vision of their future together. It remains to be seen if such a vision exists. The future of NATO will be easier to discern when the answers to those questions are clear. It is uncertain how Europe will use its new cohesiveness and fledgling power [3].

In the past, generally states involved in international politics, particularly those in wars, have commonly sought alliances or alignments to reinforce their power and influence considering power balances in European Concert. WW-II disaster has changed about the war and its destruct power ideas. In other words, the parties have searched the effective peaceful institutions instead of the conflict, which margined conventional weapon systems after Hiroshima and Nagasaki disasters. Perhaps the **deepest vital mission** of NATO was in making it clear that the establishment democratic defense barrier after WW-II in deployment with U.S. nuclear military deterrence and economic power on European map would not be repeated in another **Soviet Red Army** engagement affecting the European balance.

2. THE NEW STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AND CHANGING BALANCE OF SECURITY DEFENSE IDENTITY ON NATO AND EU MANDATE:

Today, in the first picture there is no doubt, after Cold War era, European Security concert continue to changes, but perhaps the agenda remains the same: it is to preserve peace and security and to **promote freedom** and **democratic ideals which termed in NATO Treaty**. Today The Europe again have critical choices before turning point to new to make the choices, also estimate the potentials of sharing the risks and the responsibilities for common peaceful ideals in diplomatic long ways. Following the upheaval of WW- I, France built the Maginot Line to nail down peace and stability in Europe, once and for all, by guarding against future attacks from the Germans. Now, 75 years later, we go the **same route**-and again circumstances have changed radically. In keeping

with everything else, in the 50 years since the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded, what was then focused on Europe now has become global. America-with ties to Europe [4].

The new European Order is founded on concepts like rule of law **globalization, multipolarity, national, sub-regional** or regional interests communitarisation, integration and identities that define the structure of the European regional sub-system in relation to **state behavior** an interaction. The question of self-determination, secession, and claims, of national minorities has dramatically reposed by political developments in Eastern Europe. The question of national minorities reinforced the *uti possidetis* principle of international laws as a **territorial sovereignty and integrity**, and the principles of political unity of the state. Furthermore, the official views and positions expressed about minorities and their treatment are often contradictory on a theoretical level, but more so on the level of state policy. A new era of cooperation and of mutually beneficial economic and technical relations among the southeastern European countries has opened up since the transition of most of these countries to market economies.

Whole these changing strategic realities mean that this century will require new vision and greater wisdom. Cooperative structures of the EU and NATO both are essential for the **Euro-Atlantic** community. Order. In Bosnia in 1995, and again because of Kosovo in 1999, American – led NATO forces, albeit with some broader international participation, enforced an end to war [5]. After NATO leaders meeting in Madrid in July 1997 agreed that NATO should remain open to future members under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty with process at a summit meeting in 2002. This was a compromise formula for the European states, which supported the entry of Balkans, and Baltic States should be **second wave round of enlargement**. Since Madrid prospective members, notably the Baltic States, have actively tried to persuade NATO to move swiftly to a next round of enlargement. Increasingly, NATO diplomats are speaking under policy on further enlargement. It would be imprudent for the Alliance to implement its declaratory policy on the "**open door**," before it assesses the impact of the first round of enlargement. From the NATO perspective, the Washington Summit decisions on **ESDI** were milestones. At Washington, the Allies went much further, agreeing to support operations led by the **European Union where NATO was not engaged**. Building on NATO's work with the EU, the Allies have sought the closest possible relations with the EU, to prevent the divergence of security interests, to minimize duplication of capabilities, and to ensure that non-U European Allies have a meaningful decision-shaping role in EU deliberations on European security and crisis management. NATO enlargement should become a normal process, not an exceptional one, until all qualified European democracies have the opportunity to join.

To establish for NATO-EU ad hoc working groups on security, **Headline Goal** implementation, EU access to NATO assets and capabilities, and permanent NATO-EU consultation mechanisms. In addition, Feira recognized explicitly the offers of capabilities by non-EU Allies, **specifically Turkey, Poland, the Czech Republic and Norway**, in support of future EU-led operations. Agreement on a role for NATO defense experts in analyzing requirements for the Headline Goal to help ensure the developments in agenda of the 2002 and the long-term fulfillment of the Headline Goal.

However, the **enlargement processes**, especially the European Union's, have been explicitly defined as being open once provided the interested countries meet all the required pre-defined criteria for accession, the development of regional co-operation might provide for the economic, political and security conditions which would help meet the criteria for accession. The European Union's attractiveness and influence in the **Balkan** and former **East European countries** after the fall of communist regimes stem from the hope that at some future date, it will open its gates to the countries of the region. For the countries of the region, integration within European political and security organization such as European Union, Western European Union and NATO remains the main objective.

Regional co-operation was then perceived as the main limit to integration within broader security frameworks, especially since it was feared they might be considered as a **substitute to integration**, which would either impede or delay accession. More promising may be a combination of regional projects and structures with prospects and preparation for integration into a larger Europe, meaning first of all European Union, but also the other European countries, meaning those which wish to join E.U. and will be at different stages of preparation, as well as the Ukraine and the Russian Federation which have special partnership relations with E.U.

While EU leaders took some welcome steps in these areas at the June 2000 **Summit in Feira**, Portugal, considerable work remains. From the NATO perspective, the Helsinki EU summit in December 1999 was encouraging, especially on the issue of capabilities. The highlight of the Helsinki Summit was the so-called "**Headline Goal**," through which the EU nations committed themselves to create a pool of **50.000-60.000 troops** capable of moving within weeks to a crisis area, and sustaining and conducting an operation for up to a year. Since one key to the success of ESDI is capability, this Headline Goal is a very important indicator of the EU's serious intent.

According to a recent **Euro-barometer** opinion poll, fewer than 30 percent of EU citizens believe enlargement should be a EU priority. This spring, the German chambers of industry and commerce issued a report concluding that none of the 10 Eastern and Central European countries seeking to join the EU would be ready before 2004. This would be two years after the date EU leaders set at their summit in Helsinki last December for entry of the best-qualified applicants [6]. But there is a real politic opportunity to join with Euro- Atlantic vision which continue almost sharing more than 56 years common values while there is still a peace to keep: All these changing strategic realities mean reflecting cooperative structures of the EU and NATO. Because, still unless the Europe change its defense policies will continue to depend on the transatlantic logistic, C4-I devices but the most important airpowers and nuclear force capabilities.

The **EU's need for NATO support** – in terms of defense and **force planning**, as well as access to assets and capabilities, gives all Allies, including the six, some leverage in establishing the mechanisms for NATO-EU cooperation. If NATO and the EU can find practical solutions to the unfinished business at hand- capabilities, institutional links and the participation of non-EU Allies in the EU's work-then this can be the start of a healthy, twenty-first century marriage [7]. US Foreign Secretary Cook said both he and Secretary Powell had agreed that "an increase in Europe's rapid reaction capability could strengthen NATO and we are both determined that this new European capacity shall be firmly anchored in NATO." Powell said the Bush administration has a very good understanding of what ESDI is all about, and that if it is "firmly embedded in NATO and we're not duplicating planning capabilities ...then there's no reason to see this as destabilizing NATO in any way." On the European security, I absolutely accept that it is important that we devise a model, which does not involve duplication. Duplication is wasteful [8].

3. REEVALUATE THE ONGOING PARAMETERS OF THE NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE PROJECT:

The Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) project is an ambitious attempt by the United States to develop a system to counter the possible launch of ballistic missiles by rogue states. The **National Missile Defense** (NMD) element of the project, however, has alarmed Western European governments. European Defense discusses the major debates and looks at the implications of NMD to European and world security. Like many EU states, Russia, China and Canada are also arguing that NMD will contravene existing treaties such as the **1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty**, START II and the future START III. All have expressed fears that NMD will fuel a new arms race as states attempt to increase their ballistic missile armory and develop newer missiles capable of saturating and evading NMD. Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and with ways and means to improve tactical missile defense. TMD was high on the agenda, since the Gulf War of 1991 had demonstrated how big a difference a missile threat can make under such a tense situation.

They assured the Russians of this intention by repeatedly using the language that the ABM-Treaty was **the "cornerstone of strategic stability"** between the U.S. and Russia. Yet, here is the paradox: In spite of during Cold War, nuclear missiles one of the most important were a European **reactions to US plans** for National Missile Defense (NMD) so far have been predominantly negative. For example, German Defense Minister Rudolph SCHARPING adding that, "the **principle** of arms control and non-proliferation must not be changed" [9]. Also, in the different exceptionalism argued by the French President Jack CHIRAC called America's "Attempt at **domination** in international affairs" [10]. As the French Chief of Staff, General Jean-Pierre Kelche, put it, NMD was "...the road of pessimism, the road of abandonment of nonproliferation, which was at the **heart of our common policy**, the policy of the international community" [11]. Even stronger words were used by French President Jacques Chirac, who argued that National Missile Defense was "...of a nature to **re-trigger** a proliferation of weapons, notably nuclear missiles. Everything that goes in the direction of proliferation is a bad direction." [12]

Nonetheless, most in Western Europe will closely watch to see whether Bush will continue the work of the Clinton administration by addressing the new challenges in European security alongside his Western European allies. As French Prime Minister Lionel JOSPI N had put it: „We have never been in favor of such an initiative, since it seems to us capable of upsetting the strategic balance we [sic!] have managed to maintain until now..." [13] He was echoing what the British Chief of Defense Staff, Sir Charles GUTHRIE, had stated earlier: "What I think we have to do is talk to the Americans, the rest of Europe has to talk to America, and make quite sure that the balance of destruction in the world is not made worse by this..."[14] This argument could have been heard at various places during the past two years. It is indicating that there was stability wrought about by a fine-tuned system of mutual deterrence that has proven to be better than any other instrument. NMD would upset this formula, and consequently it was a French observer who said that the acronym NMD should be spelled „no-more-deterrence" [15].

On the Russian side, of course, in contrary to **Bi- polar Super Power arms race**, cannot achieve new strategies for re- armament policies since rising financial and lack of high-technology measures comprising with US side. Absolutely, this strategy continues with losing prestige and declining failed to develop meaningful military reforms. In other words, on the one **hand Russia has the huge military** infrastructure, which Russia inherited from the Soviet Union, and the limited budget, which we spend on defense today. On the other hand, as a result of same reasons, they cannot create a correct balance between the tremendous nuclear posture and weak in modern conventional field. It is not a secret that economically Russia cannot afford to maintain its nuclear forces either at the level of the START-I, or the level of the START-II Treaty, which has not come into force after all due to the production rate of its new missiles. Most of Russia's other long-range missiles have either passed their service lifetimes. In other words, since **economic and technologic** problems Russia has **no choice** but to radically reduce the number of deployed nuclear warheads and to downsize nuclear modernization programs. The Strategic Missile Forces, which still control the bulk of Russia's strategic triad, are going to loose their status as a separate armed service. But it is not clear whether these plans would actually be implemented in the absence of the arms control regime. Also, final disaster of **Kursk Nuclear submarine** in North Sea illuminated one more time existing security problems of Russian nuclear forces. In contrary to, on the other side of the proliferation of the NBC weapons brings faces from the China- India- Pakistan and at the other side Middle East Iran- Syria- and China entered a new dynamic tripartite competition. In this context, there are some of the new proposals between the Turkey-Israel-US common missile defense arguments considering changing nature of ballistic missile.

However, US formal authorities think differently from the European, Russia and China sides. Rumsfeld said when the ABM Treaty was signed in **1972 technologies** and the circumstances in the world were notably different. “The Soviet Union – our partner in that treaty – doesn’t exist anymore,” he said. “We’re in a very different world. ... The principal threat facing the United States is **not the fear of a strategic nuclear exchange** with the Soviet Union.” The secretary also said the Russians “have to know” that the kind of missile defense capabilities the United States proposes do not threaten them in any way. “They also have to know if they look around the **globe that there are other threats**,” he said. “There are nations with increasingly **capable weapons**, that because of the **proliferation of technologies** are posing threats not just to the United States but to countries in Europe and ultimately Russia.” [16] The most important **advantage of the NMD** project that goes along with absolute deterrence capability both **overkill** and **detect** its location with new threats and risks posed by using ballistic missile states.

4. TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTION TO CHANGING ENVIRONMENT OF EUROPEAN SECURITY PHENOMENON:

Turkey demanded the right for full and equal participation in any operation directly related to its own security issues, so that problems regarding the participation of Turkey in the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) could be resolved. However the EU did not favor this proposal. What are the Turkey’s side main arguments about the ESDI? **First**, if a crisis situation breaks out in a region near Turkey and the EU wants to intervene in the situation, this will affect Turkey's security. **Secondly**, Turkey in peacetime wants to have continuous consultation with the EU, to participate in military maneuver’s, to have representatives in political and military committees and to discuss probable crises. **Thirdly**, in crisis time Turkey wants to have equal and full participation right to the planning and the operation phases when NATO capabilities will be used. In time of war, Turkey wants to have strategic administration and political control rights in operations carried out with NATO resources.

Turkish public opinion considering what will happen and will we stay on back of the European door forever with living economic problems. That time Turkey asking again the possible new roles. We hope that both of US administration and EU decision makers once again should carefully review the situation, and finally will establish a consensus considering non – EU Allies critical positions including Turkey, which this possible document should benefit for every actors vital interests.

Also, all these efforts are increasing the tendencies **USA-Israel-Turkey Trilateral Alliance** relations more than European side. But Turkey, using his geo political advantages and in around the Black Sea, Caucasus and **Balkans**. Today, Turkey under the good cruise line enhanced relations with Greece in the Aegean side. In parallel to this trend relationship with Georgia, Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Bulgaria in good shape. But, the most important rising development is Black Sea littoral states cooperation not only in **Black Sea Economic Cooperation** dimensions, but also Black Sea Force activation’s with Russia-Ukraine-Georgia-Bulgaria-Romania-Turkey for enlargement peace and stability in principles of PfP and OSCE .On the other hand, Turkey attracting from the **South Korea, Japan** and **China** cooperation proposals for defense industry modernization projects. This reality shows Turkey’s multi-axes geopolitical and economy-politic possible choices.

5. CONCLUSION

Good governance and **democracy**, as the new organizing principles of global security, will promote the kind of relationship between states that takes account of divergent interests but eliminates the use of force as a means of settling conflicts of interests. Since, it has no correctly established democratic decision & planning mechanisms for security policies and the Warsaw Pact couldn’t continue his mission as a rival to embryonic **“international collective community,”** under the NATO flag. There is a powerful possibility to imagine creating double defense systems in limited narrow standards for the near future, should be created new different strategic blockades. However, also another possibility continue to progress **toward a harmony** of interests between the NATO and EU, with lifting politic and economic barriers, continuing cultural and military rapprochement’s on the model of the cooperation which bring **peaceful platforms**.

US secretary of defense Ramsfield stressed that in Munich, our European allies and partners know that NATO is at the heart of Europe’s defenses. Therefore, to sustain our past success into the future we must first and foremost maintain NATO as the core of Europe’s security structures for Europe. Weaken NATO and we weaken Europe, which weakens all of us. We and the other nations of the alliance are bound together in pursuit and preservation of something great and good, indeed, something without parallel in history. Our greatest asset still lies in our values – freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law. And in the face of shared risks, we still must share the responsibility [17].

But, Turkey always opens the door to European dialogue since its geopolitical and cultural choices not only today from the Ottoman Empire modernization tendencies Young Turks. Turkey, every time prefers same as Ataturk Western civilization aims and principles in Republic of turkey state. We just live in democracy and universal western values. Yesterday, **Ambassador Karen FOGG** stressed on living with democracy and liberal economy principles. Yes, it’s true. EU consolidates the Spain, Portugal and Greece democracy. But remember that, we were in democracy trends in this time. Also, NATO enhanced Turkish democracy and its institutions. All these developments increased the European democracy. Yes, Turkey understands its problems and home affairs. But, all these issues have to be reciprocal mentality. We try on to increase our efforts to improve our standards in democracy and liberal economy. From a geopolitical perspective, the world in which war might erupt with healthy democracies, economic growth, sustained peace and stability deal with the realities of the struggle to replace totalitarianism. This is not an easy task, for the broaden strategic perspective Europe has clearly entered a

new security era since the mission remains of NATO is far from the complete and ESDI has to as part of comprehensive architecture for un-divided security visionary self determination on the whole continent of Europe.

Table 1 : Defense expenditures of NATO countries
Tableau 1 : Dépenses de défense des pays de l'OTAN

| Country / Pays | Currency unit / Unité monétaire (million) | 1975 | 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999e |
|--|---|--------------|-------------|-------------|------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| (0) | (-) | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
| Current prices and exchange rates / Prix et taux de change courants | | | | | | | | | | |
| Belgium | Belgian francs | 70899 | 115754 | ##### | ##### | 131156 | 131334 | 131796 | 133007 | 136393 |
| Czech Republic | Czech koruny | // | // | // | // | // | // | // | // | 41484 |
| Denmark | Danish kroner | 5355 | 9117 | 13344 | 16399 | 17468 | 17896 | 18521 | 19079 | 19577 |
| France | French francs | 55872 | 110514 | ##### | ##### | 238432 | 237375 | 241103 | 236226 | 244029 |
| Germany | Deutsche mark | 37589 | 48518 | 58650 | 68376 | 58986 | 58671 | 57602 | 58327 | 59730 |
| Greece | Drachmas | 45936 | 96975 | ##### | ##### | 1171377 | 1343276 | ##### | ##### | 1853189 |
| Hungary | Forint | // | // | // | // | // | // | // | // | 182106 |
| Italy | 1000 Italian lire | 3104 | 7643 | 17767 | 28007 | 31561 | 36170 | 38701 | 40763 | 41888 |
| Luxembourg | Luxembourg francs | 836 | 1534 | 2265 | 3233 | 4194 | 4380 | 4797 | 5197 | 5460 |
| Netherlands | Neth. guilders | 7119 | 10476 | 12901 | 13513 | 12864 | 13199 | 13345 | 13561 | 13676 |
| Norway | Norwegian kroner | 4771 | 8242 | 15446 | 21251 | 22224 | 22813 | 23010 | 25087 | 25074 |
| Poland | Zlotys | // | // | // | // | // | // | // | // | 12675 |
| Portugal | Escudos | 19898 | 43440 | ##### | ##### | 403478 | 401165 | 418772 | 420654 | 448690 |
| Spain | Pesetas 1000 | . | 350423 | ##### | ##### | 1078751 | 1091432 | ##### | ##### | 1185942 |
| Turkey | Turkish liras | 33 | 203 | 1235 | 13866 | 302864 | 611521 | ##### | ##### | 4367663 |
| United Kingdom | Pounds sterling | 5571 | 11593 | 18301 | 22287 | 21439 | 22330 | 21612 | 22551 | 22283 |
| NATO - Europe | US dollars | . | #### | #### | ### | ##### | ##### | #### | #### | ##### |
| Canada | Canadian dollars | 3360 | 5788 | 10332 | 13473 | 12457 | 11511 | 10831 | 11168 | 11048 |
| United States | US dollars | 88400 | 138191 | ##### | ##### | 278856 | 271417 | 276324 | 274278 | 283096 |
| North America | US dollars | 91704 | #### | #### | ### | ##### | ##### | #### | #### | ##### |
| NATO - Total | US dollars | . | #### | #### | ### | ##### | ##### | #### | #### | ##### |
| 1990 prices and exchange rates / Prix et taux de change de 1990 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Belgique | Francs belges | 132418 | 158789 | ##### | ##### | 115966 | 114228 | 113002 | 112522 | 113805 |
| République tchèque | Couronnes tchèques | // | // | // | // | // | // | // | // | 12626 |
| Danemark | Couronnes danoises | 14095 | 15622 | 15759 | 16399 | 15524 | 15562 | 15652 | 15653 | 15610 |
| France | Francs français | 171903 | 198895 | ##### | ##### | 214675 | 210675 | 210939 | 204751 | 210279 |
| Allemagne | Deutsche marks | 60568 | 64021 | 66139 | 68376 | 49024 | 48256 | 47077 | 47233 | 47950 |
| Grèce | Drachmes | 510756 | 524576 | ##### | ##### | 610416 | 647663 | 681584 | 740737 | 772385 |
| Hongrie | Forint | // | // | // | // | // | // | // | // | 37737 |
| Italie | 1000 lires | 22048 | 23289 | 26608 | 28007 | 24702 | 24882 | 24622 | 25207 | 25090 |
| Luxembourg | Francs | 1645 | 2232 | 2488 | 3233 | 3630 | 3758 | 4025 | 4315 | 4510 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|--------|--------|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Pays-Bas | luxem- bourgeois Florins | 10996 | 11769 | 13037 | 13513 | 11469 | 11650 | 11560 | 11427 | 11254 |
| Norvège | Couronne s nor- végiennes | 14153 | 16135 | 19712 | 21251 | 19809 | 20014 | 19713 | 21010 | 20230 |
| Pologne | Zlotys | // | // | // | // | // | // | // | // | 1697 |
| Portugal | Escudos | 259215 | 217934 | ##### | ##### | 274531 | 264795 | 269183 | 259663 | 270742 |
| Espagne | Pesetas | .. | 862375 | ##### | ##### | 828568 | 812567 | 819486 | 798016 | 828902 |
| Turquie | 1000 li- vres tur- ques | 6801 | 8567 | 9336 | 13866 | 15344 | 16402 | 17263 | 17913 | 18956 |
| Royaume-Uni | Livres sterling | 21848 | 22092 | 24576 | 22287 | 17060 | 17138 | 16107 | 16397 | 15807 |
| OTAN - Eu- rope | Dollars EU | .. | #### | #### | ### | ##### | ##### | #### | #### | ##### |
| Canada | Dollars canadiens | 8527 | 9442 | 12537 | 13473 | 11410 | 10378 | 9686 | 10047 | 9842 |
| Etats-Unis | Dollars EU | 213125 | 224685 | ##### | ##### | 240529 | 229094 | 227867 | 221927 | 225112 |
| Amérique du Nord | Dollars EU | ##### | #### | #### | ### | ##### | ##### | #### | #### | ##### |
| OTAN - Total | Dollars EU | .. | #### | #### | ### | ##### | ##### | #### | #### | ##### |

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