

Две единицы являются полисемантическими (0,66%). В эту группу входят такие фирмонимы как Масу's и 'Omni International'. Они имеют по два значения. Масу's в первом значении – фирма, а во втором – универсальный магазин. 'Omni International' в обоих значениях передает наименования отелей.

В ходе анализа были сделаны следующие выводы:

1. На основе анализа слова «фирма» термину «фирмоним» было дано следующее определение: разряд онимов, собственное имя коммерческого предприятия, в том числе промышленного или торгового, которое обладает правами юридического лица. Данный разряд онимов зачастую употребляется со словом-гиперонимом.

2. Объем выборки составил 305 единиц, что составляет 3,05% от числа всех реалий, содержащихся в словаре. 84 единицы от общего числа фирмонимов являются компаниями (27,72% от общего числа фирмонимов), 68 единиц составляют наименования ресторанов (22,44%) и 67 единиц – это отели (22,11%). Эти три вида фирмонимов по ТКП самые многочисленны. Они составляют 215 единиц, а в процентном отношении их количество равняется 72,27%, то есть почти три четверти.

3. В ряде случаев ТКП передают похожие понятия. Также в ходе анализа было выявлено сочетание двух ТКП в рамках одного названия (1 единица; 0,33%). Две единицы являются полисемантическими (0,66%).

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## NIETZSCHE: TRANSLATION AS PERSPECTIVISM

### НИЦШЕ: ПЕРЕВОД КАК ПЕРСПЕКТИВИЗМ

Статья рассматривает концепцию Ницше *Übersetzung* в большем контексте его представления об истине. Ницше основывает свою теорию на метафорическом языке, и эстетический элемент перспективизма неотделим от его критики перевода.

Ключевые слова: Ницше, перевод, перспективизм.

In *Western Translation Theory: From Herodotus to Nietzsche*, Douglas Robinson writes: “Nietzsche’s passing remarks on translation from *The Gay Science* and *Beyond Good and Evil* are not particularly original, but hold interest as late-nineteenth-century examples of romanticism that point ahead to the hermeneutical translation-theories of twentieth-century thinkers like Benjamin and Buber, Heidegger and Gadamer, Steiner and Derrida” [6, 262].

To appreciate Nietzsche’s remarks on translation in those two works of his, one has to really think through Nietzsche’s conception of translation within the context of his philosophy. The **goal** of this paper is to unfold Nietzsche’s conception of *Übersetzung* within the larger context of his notion of truth. It is argued that by translating the human being back to his or her original nature, Germans are able to translate the life-invigorating tempo of the style of the original text and thereby liberate themselves from Schopenhauerian pessimism, becoming what they are, i.e., German, or good Europeans.

This research is based on the **new conception** that states the following. Nietzsche’s critique of philosophy or knowledge in general on the basis of metaphorical language, bodily participation and truth as an aesthetic element of perspectivism is inseparable from his critique of translation, because both philosophy and translation seek to interpret reality. Moreover, the translation is a double form of interpretation, because it also interprets the original, which is already an interpretation of reality.

Since Nietzsche scathingly critiques truth in philosophy and views it as a falsification of reality, translation cannot bypass the same critique of his and must therefore be viewed as a falsification of the original text as well. Yet Nietzsche, it will be shown, by introducing (in place of truth) *art* as the only truthful element of perspectival interpretations of reality, thereby makes the unity of the German nation a possibility.

The consideration of this theme is **significant** as it allows to reveal Nietzsche’s conception of tradition.

A one-sided, divine, ‘truthful’ interpretation of existence is conducive to a falsification of human nature. Truthful interpretation should be questioned. In the opening line of *Jenseits von Gute und Böse* [3] (1886), Nietzsche compares truth with a woman: „Vorausgesetzt, daß die Wahrheit ein Weib ist –, wie?“ [3]. What he means by his supposition is that truth is fickle and changeable, weak and seductive, just like a woman. It does not let it itself be won by men. Dogmatic philosophers who have been chasing truth as men do women, have failed to grasp it. By *truth* Nietzsche, of course, means, first and foremost, the Christian truth. Nietzsche posits truth as *woman* between reality and philosopher-men who are trying to understand reality.

Nietzsche’s search for truth and his perspectivism and criticisms of the pursuit of truth as an ascetic ideal (in *Zur Genealogie der Moral* (1887)) must depend on the possibility of the existence of some truth. He develops his conception of will to power and eternal return in *Also sprach Zarathustra* (1883 – 1886) and *Jenseits von Gute und Böse* which seem to reject metaphysics, because they lay the foundation for an alternative ideal to the ascetic ideal,

on which the whole of metaphysics has rested throughout the entire history of European philosophy. Now, to contend that Nietzsche did deny the existence of truth (like Danto or Derrida) threatens the basis on which Nietzsche critiqued Christian (ascetic) morality, for example. That is, the critique or denial of the existence of truth takes place only *on the basis of some truth*, which for Nietzsche is the truth of perspectivism. It follows that if human nature is viewed only as divine or 'truthful', i.e., as stable and fixed, as in the traditional Christian sense, then the bodily, animal nature of the human being is not taken into consideration. The denial of bodily participation as valuable for divine creativity results in a falsification of the original text of human nature as animal nature. The healthy animal nature of the human being is the condition for healthy divine, creative life. The values of divine existence should, therefore, not be at variance with the animal instincts and forces of the human being. Human drives are the inexhaustible source of life energy unfolding in multiple individual, unique, perspectival, divine interpretations of existence.

Since the original text is one kind of interpretation of existence, reality may suffer a falsification if the original is not further interpreted by translation but remains forever 'true'. The truth of translation should be questioned paralleling the truth of existence as discussed above.

Inasmuch as philosophy or knowledge is a reflection of reality, translation is a reflection of the original. In translation, truth as woman is first posited between reality and the original before it is posited between the original and its translation. The connection or relation between them all is weak, respectively. There is so much 'Christianity' between the original and the reality it describes, and even more weakness between the original and its translation that to claim the truth or correctness of the translation is an absurdity.

Language may have been one of the misleading obstacles in chasing truth. According to Christian J. Emden's discussion of Nietzsche's view of language as metaphor in his *Nietzsche on Language, Consciousness, and the Body* [3], Maudemarie Clark's claim [2] that the mature Nietzsche believed that knowledge of truth can be obtained and that he accepted the correspondence theory of truth, may utterly fail if one takes into consideration Nietzsche's account of *metaphor*. For Nietzsche, metaphor is a rhetorical phenomenon intrinsic to all linguistic and, therefore, scientific representations. If all language is metaphor, however, then the concept of metaphor itself collapses, as it can no longer mark a distinction in linguistic categories. However, Nietzsche embraces both the philosophical significance of a rhetorical problem and the rhetorical element as inherent in language (as opposed to Plato and Locke, who consider eloquence as inappropriate to philosophy). But, since for Nietzsche rhetorical elements do not bear a strict correspondence to reality – because language for him is as an organic process – there arises the question of how communication (and, in our case, translation) is possible. Nietzsche's response is that metaphor is a means of transferring signs between humans. Signs, however, do not directly correspond to reality. Therefore, communication is forever *indeterminate*. This indeterminacy is emphasised by physiological processes. Metaphor and physiology meet in memory, the seat of human consciousness. It follows that the human mind is a product of human physiology inseparable from the need for communication. Nietzsche's metaphorical account of memory, language, and consciousness, thanks to which knowledge, mind, and society are possible, should be understood as a legitimate effort to synthesise the complex terms of the persistent mind-body problem. Since communication and translation are necessarily connected, the indeterminacy of communication renders the translation of the original, which is in itself already a kind of indeterminate communication, even more indeterminate than the original text.

Furthermore, the indeterminacy of translation denies the translation itself the possibility of being an effect of the original. All relations are consequences of the essences of things, not their essences [10, 381]. A metaphor comes into existence when cause and effect become identified. Analogically, if translation is a kind of metaphor of the original, the translation is a consequence of the essence of the original, not the original itself. Since, also, the original is the consequence of the essence of the reality which it seeks to describe, the translation is double the consequence, i.e., it is also the consequence of the essence of the reality which the original describes. Effects are not causes, as much as translations are not originals. Since both the translation of the original and the original itself strive to describe one and the same reality, while the translation at the same time seeks to reinterpret the original – and thus both are inexact (the translation is even more inexact) – the distinction made between the original and its translation – that the original cannot be called the cause of the translation, nor can the translation be termed the effect of the original – should remain conscious of the similarity between them in this, that they both falsify the reality they describe. This needs to be pursued further.

In light of the above, I think that Nietzsche would go so far as to say that translation is not only an inexact representation of the original but also a falsification thereof. "It is this falsified world of 'conceptual mummies' that occupies the philosophers: 'Philosophy, as I alone still admit, as the universal form of history, as the attempt to somehow describe and abbreviate in signs Heraclitean becoming (as if *translated* and mummified in a type of apparent Being [*Sein*])' [10, 386]. Therefore, whenever a human being creates, he or she creates a falsified world. It follows that the original is a falsification of reality and the translation of the original is a falsification of the 'original' falsification of reality, therefore (necessarily) of the original as well. Thus the translation is a double falsification of reality.

Furthermore, Nietzsche writes: " 'Language, it seems, was invented only for what is average, medium, communicable. With language, the speaker immediately vulgarizes himself' [10, 389]. It follows that, since translation is also one kind of interpretation of the original, thereby of existence, the original text suffers a falsification if it is viewed as the 'original', 'truthful', divine text, i.e., as stable and fixed. In this regard the truth of the 'truth' of translation should be questioned.

Any critique of truth is a perspective interpretation that already presupposes an established belief, which largely depends on our *affects* or *drives*, according to Nietzsche [8, 12]. These affects or drives are embodied and

influence human understanding of reality. Bodily participation in representations of things extends to all activities of the mind. Translation is one of them. In fact, representation of things involves translation of those things together with human affects or drives into the realm of perspectivism. Translational perspectivism is in itself an interpretation of things and cognitive activities. Analogically, human affects or drives are admixed to the translation of the original text, which is already an affected representation of reality. From this it follows that translation of the original text is subject to perspectivism. The beauty of it all is that perspectivism is inseparable from translation, for there is an aesthetic element in the activity of translation which, I believe, is posited by Nietzsche as truth.

Nietzsche would agree that translation claims that it has access to truth in striving to communicate the original to the foreign reader, for it strives to grasp the whole and fix it as truth. Truths are necessary to make life and knowledge possible, but since they are uncertain or false, they should not be relied upon. The aesthetic criterion, however, is more important than truth, for it is the creative drive. This choice of aesthetic criteria is, for Nietzsche, one of necessity, for the criteria by which to judge correctness or certainty are not available to man: “the correct perception – which would mean the adequate expression of the object in a subject – as a contradictory impossibility: for between two absolutely different spheres, as between subject and object, there is no causality, no correctness, no expression: there is, at most an *aesthetic* relation’ [10, 378]. In this context, the original text should be regarded as an aesthetic relation between the subject (the writer) and the object (the reality that the writer describes). The translation of such an original text is the aesthetic relation between the translator as agent or subject and the original as object. The truth of translation as an aesthetic element can find itself at home in the very multiplicity of translations of the original text, i.e., in their perspectivism. Moreover, the more perspectives we have, the better we are as persons, as individuals. Likewise, Nietzsche would say that the more perspectival translations or translational perspectives we have, the better we are as practical translators or translation theorists.

What follows from the above discussion is that the denial of the translator’s bodily participation, as valuable for divine creativity, results in a falsification of both the original text and the original text of human existence as divine, true, stable and fixed (whereas they both are, in fact, affected by the animal characteristics of the human being). The healthy animal nature of the writer of the original text is the first condition for a healthy, divine translation of the original. The second condition for a healthy, divine translation of the healthy original text is the healthy animal nature of the translator. Therefore, the values of a divine translation of the original should not be in contradiction with the animal instincts and forces of both the translator and the writer of the original text. Finally, the human drives of the translator are an inexhaustible source of creative energy unfolding in multiple individual, unique, perspectival, divine interpretations of the original text, which should be subject to the same healthy qualities of the writer of the original.

From the above discussion of the nature of translation in the context of Nietzsche’s critique of truth it follows that a healthy interpretation of existence is conducive to a healthy translation of the original. At the core of the healthy interpretation of existence is a realisation of being as becoming, which leads to multiple perspectival interpretations of existence, whereas at the core of a healthy translation lies the *running*, life-invigorating tempo of the style of the original, according to Nietzsche. The larger notion of Nietzsche’s *Übersetzung* is the translation of the human being from a one-sided ‘divine’, Christian interpretation of human nature back to its original text, its animal nature and re-creation of all values on the basis of truth as affirmation of life through *art*, thereby overcoming Schopenhauerian pessimism overwhelming the whole of Europe and emancipating the Germans lacking Germanity from the Christian narrow-mindedness, thus helping them become a united German nation, i.e., good Europeans, within the unity of Europe. In this regard, a healthy translation following the dechristianisation of the German race is a great tool in delivering the Germans from Schopenhauerian pessimism by adopting the free-spirited style of translating from the Romans. This will be discussed in more detail below.

Truth is an ideal constructed by philosopher-men. It cannot *not* be created. It has to be created in order to somehow represent reality so that one can orient oneself in it. Human beings are ideal-makers, because they are bodies and have differences. As bodies, they create images of themselves – i.e., they translate themselves into images they thus become. Moreover, they act according to their ‘translations’. The truth of the images humans translate themselves into must be re-evaluated within the context of body. Nietzsche’s going beyond *Gute* and *Böse* in *Jenseits von Gute und Böse*, does not mean that those conceptions should be eliminated. On the contrary, they should be re-evaluated on the basis of bodily participation in the creation of values and held accountable to the bodies they are enabling humans to become. Thus, as Zarathustra says, human beings should “remain faithful to the earth” (*The Portable Nietzsche* (PN) 188–189). The earth as a body will give birth to the *Übermensch* if Zarathustra, who after descending the mountain in search of his children (PN 438), in Oppel’s interpretation, enters into an interdependence with woman. From this it follows that since ideals live in bodies, humans are called upon to cultivate a physiological perspective that would see values as expressions of health. Healthy ideals would refine senses, strengthen human instincts and release creative energies [4]. Since ideals would involve all kinds of translations as human valuations of the original text, translations, then, must agree with bodily health. What does a healthy translation mean, after all? I think that for Nietzsche it would mean to be able to render the tempo of the original.

In the following passage on translation from *Jenseits von Gute und Böse*, Nietzsche expressly says that what is most difficult in translation to render is the *tempo* of the style of the original. Moreover, he believes that one fails to preserve the original tempo when translating into German. The reason for it, I believe Nietzsche thinks, is the serious, thoughtful mentality of the German race affected by Christian morality. With the loss of tempo, unique, individual *nuances* of the original are unfortunately never conveyed and the translation thus becomes merely a simplification, vulgarisation and falsification of the original text. He writes: Was sich am schlechtesten aus einer Sprache in die andere übersetzen läßt, ist das tempo ihres Stils: als welcher im Charakter der Rasse seinen Grund

hat, physiologischer gesprochen, im Durchschnitts-tempo ihres „Stoffwechsels“. Es gibt ehrlich gemeinte Übersetzungen, die beinahe Fälschungen sind, als unfreiwillige Vergemeinerungen des Originals, bloß weil sein tapferes und lustiges tempo nicht mit übersetzt werden konnte, welches über alles Gefährliche in Dingen und Worten wegspringt, weghilft. Der Deutsche ist beinahe des Presto in seiner Sprache unfähig: also, wie man billig schließen darf, auch vieler der ergötzlichsten und verwegenen Nuances des freien, freigeisterischen Gedankens. So gut ihm der Buffo und der Satyr fremd ist, in Leib und Gewissen, so gut ist ihm Aristophanes und Petronius unübersetzbar. Alles Gravitätische, Schwerflüssige, Feierlich-Plumpe, alle langwierigen und langweiligen Gattungen des Stils sind bei den Deutschen in überreicher Mannichfaltigkeit entwickelt... [6].

The term *Durchschnitts* Nietzsche uses for ‘average’ literally means ‘cut through’ and it directly refers to “*Stoffwechsels*” (‘exchange of substance resulting in release of energy’), which suggests that the tempo of the style of the original is essentially inherent in the bodily constitution of the race. As is evident, the original, according to Nietzsche, cannot be thought of merely in intellectual, metaphysical concepts, but it finds its grounds in the very physiology of the writer (and the translator). Further, in order for a German to translate (to Nietzsche’s standards) a text that would have the tempo of Aristophanes’ or Petronius’ works, he or she must have the same physiological constitution. Therefore, it is evident that Nietzsche grounds translation in physiology, that is, in body.

Further, Nietzsche makes an exception for Lessing, whom he considers a free spirit, yet he immediately denies the German language and Lessing’s prose the possibility of imitating the galloping tempo of Machiavelli’s “Principe”: Lessing macht eine Ausnahme ... .. Lessing liebte auch im tempo die Freigeisterei, die Flucht aus Deutschland. Aber wie vermöchte die deutsche Sprache, und sei es selbst in der Prosa eines Lessing, das tempo Macchiavell’s nachzuahmen, der, in seinem principe, die trockne feine Luft von Florenz athmen lässt und nicht umhin kann, die ernsteste Angelegenheit in einem unbändigen Allegrissimo vorzutragen: vielleicht nicht ohne ein boshafte Artisten-Gefühl davon, welchen Gegensatz er wagt, – Gedanken, lang, schwer, hart, gefährlich, und ein tempo des Galopps und der allerbesten muthwilligsten Laune [6].

Nietzsche likewise denies the German language the capacity to translate the works of Petronius: “Wer endlich dürfte gar eine deutsche Übersetzung des Petronius wagen, der ... .. die Füße eines Windes hat, den Zug und Athem, den befreienden Hohn eines Windes, der Alles gesund macht, indem er Alles laufen macht!” [6]. The remedy for the sickness of the German language will be found further on. For now, as is evident, the significance of health in any text is crucial to Nietzsche’s understanding of translation in general.

As has been shown, Nietzsche makes the point that the German language, as well as the German-speaking people, because they are ones who speak it, lacks a joyful, ironic tempo in translation. Such a tempo, Nietzsche would say, is necessary for a light-spirited translation that would enhance human life and exalt the spirit of the individual. Even Plato, whom Nietzsche critiques among other wise philosophers, and who repudiated Greek life, could not do without a book of Aristophanes (JGB §28), for he desired to engage in lively irony, apart from his moral discussions of truth, good, beauty, virtue and justice. In order to harness the tempo, Nietzsche would propose *Selbstüberwindung*. This has to be looked at more closely.

As fully unchristian beings, the Romans viewed translation as (self-) conquest, according to Nietzsche. This is what he sees to be lacking in the Germans, as prone to Schopenhauerian pessimism, as will be demonstrated below.

Nietzsche provides another short passage on translation in *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft* (1882). To cite the larger part of the passage would help the reader to contrast the free-spiritedness of the Romans against the sluggishness of the Germans. “Übersetzungen. – Man kann den Grad des historischen Sinnes, welchen eine Zeit besitzt, daran abschätzen, wie diese Zeit Übersetzungen macht und vergangene Zeiten und Bücher sich einzuverleiben sucht... Und das römische Alterthum selbst: wie gewaltsam und naiv zugleich legte es seine Hand auf alles Gute und Hohe des griechischen älteren Alterthums! Wie übersetzten sie in die römische Gegenwart hinein! Wie verwischten sie absichtlich und unbekümmert den Flügelstaub des Schmetterlings Augenblick! So übersetzte Horaz hier und da den Alcäus oder den Archilochus, so Properz den Callimachus und Philetas (Dichter gleichen Ranges mit Theokrit, wenn wir urtheilen dürfen): was lag ihnen daran, dass der eigentliche Schöpfer Diess und Jenes erlebt und die Zeichen davon in sein Gedicht hineingeschrieben hatte! – als Dichter waren sie dem antiquarischen Spürgeiste, der dem historischen Sinne voranläuft, abhold, als Dichter liessen sie diese ganz persönlichen Dinge und Namen und Alles, was einer Stadt, einer Küste, einem Jahrhundert als seine Tracht und Maske zu eigen war, nicht gelten, sondern stellten flugs das Gegenwärtige und das Römische an seine Stelle. Sie scheinen uns zu fragen: „Sollen wir das Alte nicht für uns neu machen und uns in ihm zurechtlegen? Sollen wir nicht unsere Seele diesem todten Leibe einblasen dürfen? denn todt ist er nun einmal: wie hässlich ist alles Todte!“ – Sie kannten den Genuss des historischen Sinnes nicht; das Vergangene und Fremde war ihnen peinlich, und als Römern ein Anreiz zu einer römischen Eroberung. In der That, man eroberte damals, wenn man übersetzte, – nicht nur so, dass man das Historische wegliess: nein, man fügte die Anspielung auf das Gegenwärtige hinzu, man strich vor Allem den Namen des Dichters hinweg und setzte den eigenen an seine Stelle – nicht im Gefühl des Diebstahls, sondern mit dem allerbesten Gewissen des *Imperium Romanum*“ [5].

According to the text, although the Romans lacked the historical sense that Nietzsche possessed (he considers himself the first philosopher with a historical sense), they were free-spirited as a nation and they made free-spirited translations of Greek literature. They made the old new, adjusting Greek texts to their time and had no particular interest in keeping Greek ideas fixed and stable. Thus they conquered as they translated, and they did so with a good conscience, without feeling guilty for what they did. Nietzsche praises them for the bravery with which they acted in creating new ideas, which is fundamental to Nietzsche’s understanding of Being as (an ever-changing) becoming. For him, being is *becoming*, i.e., reality is in flux and changing, it is unique. To classify reality is to falsify and simplify it.

Becoming for Nietzsche presupposes law-breaking taking place before law-making. He would associate law-breaking with Romans ignoring the individual traits of Greek authors (and replacing their Greek names with Roman names) and the particular characters of the societies they lived in, and law-making with adjustment of Greek originals to Roman standards.

The Romans engaged in free translation because they were not concerned with concepts of truth. Max Stirner was the first to raise the question of the value of truth. “[His] critique of truth as a fixed idea embodied much of what was central to Nietzsche’s – the pervasiveness of the will to truth, truth’s relationship to divinity, its present existence as an unexamined ideal, and above all its existence as both a symbol and a cause of the inability to enquire and to act freely in all directions” [1, 13]. In the above-quoted passage on translation, Nietzsche suggests that once Being is viewed as fixed and stable, i.e., as truthful, it begins to suffer the burden of limitations placed upon it. Truth impedes the development of Being, therefore it must necessarily impede the beings of Being, in particular the freedom of translation. Romans were not possessed by concepts of truth as a fixed idea; therefore they acted freely, translating Greek texts as they did.

This is precisely what is lacking in – and what Nietzsche critiques about – Europe, especially the German-speaking people: the sluggishness and pessimism of the Christian *Spannung des Geistes* [6] spread across Europe. He is raging about the spectre of Schopenhauerian pessimism haunting nineteenth-century Europe. Schopenhauer clearly realised the non-divinity of existence. Yet, according to Nietzsche, he could not answer his own question as to whether existence has any meaning at all. “... Die Ungöttlichkeit des Daseins galt ihm (Schopenhauer) als etwas Gegebenes, Greifliches, Undiskutirbares...”

... [D]as ist nunmehr vorbei, das hat das Gewissen gegen sich, das gilt allen feineren Gewissen als unanständig, unehrlich, als Lüge, Feminismus, Schwachheit, Feigheit, – mit dieser Strenge, wenn irgend womit, sind wir eben gute Europäer und Erben von Europas längster und tapferster Selbstüberwindung. Indem wir die christliche Interpretation dergestalt von uns stossen und ihren „Sinn“ wie eine Falschmünzerei verurtheilen, kommt nun sofort auf eine furchtbare Weise die Schopenhauerische Frage zu uns: hat denn das Dasein überhaupt einen Sinn?“ [5].

Nietzsche explained the event of German (and European) pessimism or nihilism (rejection of everything that is true) as historically positive on the basis of the unconditional honest atheism that had sprung from Christian morality itself after two thousand years’ training in truthfulness. He writes: „... der unbedingte redliche Atheismus ist... ein endlich und schwer errungener Sieg des europäischen Gewissens, als der folgenreichste Akt einer zweitausendjährigen Zucht zur Wahrheit, welche am Schlusse sich die Lüge im Glauben an Gott verbietet... Man sieht, was eigentlich über den christlichen Gott gesiegt hat: die christliche Moralität selbst, der immer strenger genommene Begriff der Wahrhaftigkeit, die Beichtväter-Feinheit des christlichen Gewissens, übersetzt und sublimiert zum wissenschaftlichen Gewissen, zur intellektuellen Sauberkeit um jeden Preis. Die Natur ansehen, als ob sie ein Beweis für die Güte und Obhut eines Gottes sei; die Geschichte interpretieren zu Ehren einer göttlichen Vernunft... „ [5].

Thus now that truth-seeking Christianity has finally found it, it forbids itself the lie involved in the belief of God; Christian morality is overcome, and *das Dasein* has no meaning. Yet, the fact that Nietzsche says that the Germans are not pessimists leaves hope for the opposite idea that they are optimists, and the fact that he also refers to himself as a good European (not a German) calls for a unity not only of *das Volk* but also of *das ganze Europa*. As a good European, Nietzsche writes that „... der Pessimismus Schopenhauers nicht nur ein Ausnahme-Fall unter Deutschen, sondern ein deutsches Ereigniss gewesen ist: während Alles, was sonst im Vordergrund steht, unsre tapfere Politik, unsre fröhliche Vaterländerei, welche entschlossen genug alle Dinge auf ein wenig philosophisches Princip hin („Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles“) betrachtet, also *sub specie speciei*, nämlich der deutschen *species*, mit grosser Deutlichkeit das Gegentheil bezeugt. Nein! die Deutschen von heute sind keine Pessimisten! Und Schopenhauer war Pessimist, nochmals gesagt, als guter Europäer und nicht als Deutscher“ [5].

The Christian conscience translated – and thereby sublimated to the purely intellectual, scientific conscience – experiences a downfall and self-rejection. Only the good Europeans as a whole, who are heirs of Europe’s self-overcoming, can realise the non-divine nature of existence and give meaning to their life by creating and living up to their values. The task of Europeans now, as Nietzsche sees it, is to translate the meaningless existence into a fully meaningful *Dasein* that does not mean *being-there* understood as ‘being in the world beyond’ but *being-here*, i.e., being or living in the present moment of existence as creative individuals on earth. In this context such a translation is synonymous with creation. *Dasein* is translated into *Da-sein*, Being into *Be-ing*, i.e. becoming, with multiple perspectival interpretations thereof, as existing phenomenally, uniquely: *Be-ing* is a creative extension of the origin, a creative translation of the original *to be* into the language of humankind. With such a translation, the human becomes the Overhuman (*Übermensch*). Thus the human being is the self-translator, the translator of his or her own nature originally written in the language of divinity into the mother-tongue of his or her animal nature – and back into divinity – on the basis of bodily participation.

It follows from the above discussion that Nietzsche would want human beings, in particular the Germans, to overcome Christian morality. But what does it mean to be German for Nietzsche, after all? This question can be raised only within the larger context of Nietzsche’s conception of translation, which is for him translation of human nature back into its original. Nietzsche recognises that „...der schreckliche Grundtext *homo natura* wieder heraus erkannt werden muss. Den Menschen nämlich zurückübersetzen in die Natur; über die vielen eitlen und schwärmerischen Deutungen und Nebensinne Herr werden, welche bisher über jenen ewigen Grundtext *homo natura* gekritzelt und gemalt wurden...“ (JGB §230) For Nietzsche, the translation of humankind back into its

nature signifies that human nature is essentially animal nature. It is not merely divine as Christianity has proclaimed it to be. The animal nature of the human being is the original text that has been misinterpreted by Christianity. As a result, a Christian mistranslation of human nature as divine has occurred in the history of Europe, particularly in the history of German-speaking people. It follows that to be human one must become unchristian. If the Germans become unchristian, they become human; if they become human, then they finally become what they are, i.e. German, or good Europeans. It follows that they must become unchristian to be German – this is what is stressed in the concluding quote: “Vergessen wir doch nicht, dass die Völkernamen gewöhnlich Schimpfnamen sind... Die „Deutschen“: das bedeutet ursprünglich „die Heiden“: so nannten die Gothen nach ihrer Bekehrung die grosse Masse ihrer ungetauften Stammverwandten... Es wäre immer noch möglich, dass die Deutschen aus ihrem alten Schimpfnamen sich nachträglich einen Ehrennamen machten, indem sie das erste unchristliche Volk Europa's würden...” [5].

As is clear, Nietzsche does not lose hope that the German-speaking people, although they bear an originally disparaging name *Deutsch*, will unite one day (and they *are* united now: they even constitute the backbone of the European Union – so Nietzsche may be called a prophet) when they shake off one-sided Christian interpretation and engage in perspectivism and phenomenology, in the context of which translation is at the same time necessarily rethought as an aesthetic perspectival interpretation of the original text and reality on the basis of bodily participation.

In conclusion, the above discussion of Nietzsche's conception of translation has found translation to be a necessary, life-affirming interpretation of both the original text and the reality which both the original and its translation strive to interpret. Furthermore, translation is only an interpretation, to which there can be no alternative. The more translations we make of the same original, the better we are as translators. Perspectival interpretation is the only alternative to methods for accessing truth. Likewise, multiple translations of the original are a wonderful alternative to dogmatically imposing certain rules on translation, thus making only one or few translations of the original possible. It has been shown that the life-invigorating *allegro* element is central to Nietzsche's concept of translation as affirmation and enhancement of existence crucial to the Germans becoming good Europeans within a united Europe.

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